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RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife, BOYD A.
SWENSEN and BEATRICE SWENSEN,
his wife, BLAINE ANDERSON and
SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife,
HOPE A. HILTON, CYNTHIA
HILTON, RALPH M. HILTON, GENE
HELLAND and the MIDDLE EAST
FOUNDATION,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
Case No. 19704
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES 1 to
V, being former Commissioners
of the Utah Department of
Financial Institutions,
Defendants and Respondents.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants deposited
with

Grove

Finance

Company.

substantial
When

the

sums of money
Company

became

insolvent, the appellants brought an action against the
State of Utah and the Commissioner of the Department of
Financial

Institutions

for

their

failure

to

perform

statutory duties which would have protected the deposits.

1

Appellants1 original action was dismissed by the
Court due to a failure to file a notice of claim with the
State prior to commencing the action.
that dismissal on various grounds.

Appellants appealed

In Madsen v. Borthick,

658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), this Court upheld the Governmental
Immunity Actf and found that it applied to the suit brought
by the appellants.

The Court held that because a notice of

claim was not filed, the dismissal was proper.

658 P.2d at

632.
On July 20, 1983, a second complaint was filed by
the appellants.
W.

Smoot

This complaint named Mirvin D. Borthick and

Brimhall,

individually,

as

defendants.

The

complaint alleged that their actions and failure to act
constituted gross negligence.

(R 2-8.)

The respondents were successful in obtaining a
Summary Judgment on this second action.

The grounds were

that a) res judicata acted as a bar to the second action;
b) that respondents are immune from suit under §63-30-1, et
seq. , Utah Code Ann., for the same reason set out in Madsen
v. Borthick, supra; and c) that the applicable statute of
limitations bars the current action. (R. 89, 90., R. 35.)
This brief sets forth the reasons why none of the
grounds

granting

Appellants

should

Summary
be

Judgment

allowed

prepare for trial.

2

are

appropriate.

to continue discovery

and

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The

Third

Judicial

District

Court

granted

respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds of
res judicata, immunity from suit under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, et seq. , and the
statute of limitations.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to reverse the order granting
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case
for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs-Appellants
originally

brought

suit against

Mirvin D.

Borthick,

Financial

Institutions

Commissioner
on

or

(hereinafter
the
of
about

State
the

Madsen),

of Utah and
Department

March

2,

of

1981).

(R. 35.)
On March 27, 1981, the State made a Motion to
Dismiss because of Madsen's failure to file a notice of
claim with the State prior to seeking judicial relief.
(R. 69)
That case was dismissed by the District Court on
May 14, 1981. (R. 69.)
The Supreme Court of Utah, on appeal in Madsen v.
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), found that the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act applied.

Hence, Madsen's failure

to file a notice of claim before commencing the action

3

barred Madsen from continuing in the action,, The dismissal
was thus affirmed on January 28, 1983.

658 P. 2d 627 (Utah

1983) .
On July 20, 1983, the complaint in the current
action

was

filed

in

the

Third

District

Court.

(R. 2.)
On September 19, 1983, respondents made a Motion
for

Summary

Judgment.

The

motion

was

argued

before

Judge Dee of the Third District Court on November 21, 1983.
(R. 32, 32, 86.)
On December 8, 1983, Judge Dee signed an order
granting defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 90.)
It is from that final order that this appeal is taken.
POINT I.
THE DISMISSAL OF THE ORIGINAL
ACTION WAS NOT ON THE MERITS
The

District

Court,

in

granting

respondents1

Motion for Summary Judgment, held that the doctrine of res
judicata was applicable.
would

be

necessary

that

dismissed on the merits.

For this to be true, however, it
the original

action

have been

A judgment on the merits is a

mandatory prerequisite to applicability of the doctrine of
res judicata.

Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265,

81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551; Wilson v. Bittick, 403 P.2d 159
(Cal. 1965).

4

Res judicata is inapplicable because the dismissal
of the original action was not on the merits.

In fact, the

issue of the dismissal and whether it was on the merits is
the kingpin to the majority of the other issues to be
addressed in this appeal.
NOT ON THE MERITS
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that:
In order that a judgment may constitute
a bar to another suit, it must be . . .
determined on its merits. If the first
suit was dismissed
for defect of
pleadings, or parties, . . . or was
disposed of on any ground which did not
go to the merits of the action, the
judgment rendered will prove no bar to
another
suit.
Costello v. United
States, supra, at 286 quoting Hughes v.
United States, 4 Wall 232, 18 L.Ed. 303.
PROCEDURAL DEFECT
One reason that dismissal for a procedural defect
is not considered to be on the merits is because the actual
merits of the claim are not considered by the court.

The

plaintiff is never permitted to reach the point where the
court could consider plaintiff's rights and the defendant's
LiabilvtY ^risirvg o\rt of "the claim.

Tb,e defewiatvt does s,o*t

have to incur the inconvenience of preparing to meet the
merits because the procedural dismissal is an initial bar to
the court's reaching them.

5

In the original action, the defendants were served
with process on March 9, 1981 and March 12, 1981. Two weeks
later, on March 27, 1981, before an answer was filed, the
defendants made the Motion to Dismiss for failure to file a
notice of claim.

The District Court granted the motion on

May 14, 1981, never reaching or considering the substantive
portion of plaintiffs8 claim.

This is also supported by the

Court's language in the original Madsen v. Borthick:
The dismissal of plaintiffs1 complaint
against the State was proper on the
basis of governmental immunity and
noncompliance
with
the
notice
requirement. 658 P.2d at 632.
In other words, since the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was
found

to

apply,

requirement.

the

notice

of

claim

was

a

necessary

Dismissal for failure to file a notice of

claim was a dismissal for a procedural defect—not on the
merits.
UTAH LAW FAVORS MADSEN
This Court in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P. 2d 144
(Utah 1979) , held that a dismissal of an action for the
failure of a plaintiff
provisions
merits.

does

not

to comply with notice of claim

constitute

an

adjudication

on

the

Such a failure merely involves a procedural defect

unrelated to the merits of the actual claim in any way.
Such a failure may be fatal to a suit, but it does not act
as a bar to a subsequent suit if the defect was cured or was
inapplicable to the second action.

6

It must be explained

that Foil v. Ballinger,

involved a failure to file a notice of claim in a medical
malpractice

action as opposed

government.

The

principle,

to an action against the
however,

is

the

same;

a

dismissal for failure to comply with a condition precedent
is not on the merits.
There are numerous instances in which
the law requires fulfillment of a
condition precedent before the filing of
a complaint, and failure to comply with
the condition may result in a dismissal,
but not on the merits.
Foil v.
Ballinger, supra, at 150.
COMPARISON OF LANGUAGE
The medical malpractice act states:
No
malpractice
action . . . may
be
initiated unless and until the plaintiff
gives the prospective defendant .
notice of
intent
to commence an
action . . . . §78-14-8, Utah Code Ann.
(1953).
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act states:
Any person having a claim for injury to
person
or
property
against
a
governmental entity . . . shall, before
maintaining an action under this act,
file a written notice of claim . . . .
§63-30-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
In comparing the two sections quoted above, it is
apparent that even though the wording differs, the meaning
is the same:

giving notice is a condition precedent to

initiating or maintaining an action.

Hence, the rule set

down in Foil v. Ballinger, is applicable in this case.

7

For these reasons, the original action was not
dismissed on the merits.

Res judicata is inapplicable here

and does not operate as a bar to Madsenfs current action.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT IMMUNE
FROM SUIT UNDER THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT ON A
CLAIM OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE
A.

NO IMMUNITY
The respondents in this action are individuals

being sued in their individual capacity only.

Madsen seeks

to establish, if allowed to proceed to trial, that the
respondents1 actions and their failure to act constituted
gross negligence.
This
allegations

of

action

against

gross

negligence

Governmental Immunity Act.

individuals
is

not

solely

barred

by

on
the

Section 63-30-4, Utah Code Ann.

(1953), as it stood at the time this action arose, states:
(3) The
remedy
against
a
governmental entity or its employee for
an injury caused by an act or omission
which occurs during the performance of
such employee's duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of
authority is, after the effective date
of this act, exclusive of any other
civil action or proceeding by reason of
the same subject matter against the
employee or the estate of the employee
whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim, unless the employee acted or
failed to act through gross negligence,
fraud, or malice.
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(4) An employee may be joined in
an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act
or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be
liable, but no employee shall be held
personally liable for acts or omissions
occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of
employment or under color of authority,
unless it is established that the
employee acted or failed to act due to
gross negligence, fraud, or malice.
(Emphasis added.)
The
apply

to

Utah

Governmental

individuals

in

governmental entities.

the

Immunity
same

way

Act
it

does

not

applies

to

Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925

(Utah 1977), held that if no judgment is obtained against a
governmental entity, the plaintiff may proceed against an
employee thereof.
Madsen
against

the

571 P.2d at 927.
is

State

definitely
or

the

barred
Department

from
of

proceeding
Financial

Institutions by virtue of the matters decided in Madsen v.
Borthick, supra.

However, there is no bar to proceeding

against the employees on allegations of gross negligence.

B.

NOTICE OF CLAIM NOT REQUIRED
Appellants do not dispute that in order for a

potential plaintiff to proceed against the government, where
a governmental function is involved, a notice of claim must
first be filed.

9

A notice of claim need net be filed when an action
is brought against government employees on allegations of
gross negli<?encef fraud, or malice. Section 63-30-11, Utah
as

Code Ann,/

it existed at the time this action arose,

provided:
Service of the notice of claim upon an
employee of a governmental entity is not
a
condition
precedent
to
the
commencement of an action . . . against
such person.
If an action . . . is
commenced against the employee, but not
against the governmental entity, service
of the notice of claim upon the
governmental entity is required only if
the entity has a statutory duty to
indemnify
such
person.
(Emphasis
added.)
Thus, the question becomes, is there a statutory duty to
an

indemnify
negligence?

employee

T

sued

on

allegations

of

gross

he answer to this is no.

Section

63-48-4, Utah Code Ann.

(1953), as it

existed at the time the action arose, stated:
(4) No public entity is obligated
to pay any judgment based upon a claim
against an officer or employee if it is
established that the officer or employee
acted or failed to act due to gross
negligence, fraud, or malice. (Emphasis
added.)
Ear tJbie&e reasons* > no service of a. aotlce of claim
was necessary because Madsen's action is based solely on
allegations of gross negligence.
POINT III
MADSEN'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED
BY ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Madsen's
Mr. Brimh^H

was

claim

against

Mr.

filed on July 20, 1983.
10

Borthick

and

Respondents have

asserted that the claim is barred by any one of three
statutes of limitation. (R. 16f 29.)
Due to the operation of §78-12-40 f Utah Code Ann.
(1953) , there is no statute of limitation problem:
If any action is commenced within due
time and . . . the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action
otherwise than on the merits, and the
time limited either by law or contract
for commencing the same shall have
expired,
the
plaintiff . . . may
commence a new action within one year
after
the
reversal
or
failure.
(Emphasis added.)
The

first

action

was

commenced

by

filing

a

complaint with the District Court on or about March 2, 1981.
This is in line with the method outlined in the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure:
A civil action is commenced (1) by
filing a complaint with the court, or
(2) by the service of a summons. Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not define any other
method for commencement of an action.

Hence, pursuant to

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the original
action

was

commenced

when

a

complaint

was

filed

with

the District Court in March of 1981.
As explained in Point I, above, the dismissal of
the original action was not on the merits.

The dismissal

was affirmed by this Court on January 28, 1983, in Madsen v.
Borthick,

supra.

The

current

11

action

was

commenced

on

July 20, 1983, well within the one-year period allowed by
§78-12-40, Utah Code Ann.
For

these

reasons,

there

is

limitations bar to the current action.

no

statute

of

Madsen should be

allowed to proceed in this action.
POINT IV
THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
ARE NOT RETROACTIVE AS TO
THE APPELLANTS
The 1983 Utah Legislature made various changes in
the

Utah

Governmental

Immunity

Act, §63-30-1, et

seq.

Certain amendments work to bring governmental employees1
actions

that

amount

to

gross

negligence

within

the

Ann.,

was

protective immunity of the Act.
Specifically,
amended

to

provide

§63-30-4,

that

an

Utah

employee

Code
may

not

be

held

personally liable for acting or failing to act unless it is
established

he

acted

due

to

fraud

or

malice.

Gross

negligence is no longer a basis for personal liablity under
this

section.

(§63-30-4, Utah

Code

Ann.

(1983

pocket

supplement)).
Section 63-30-11, Utah Code Ann., was amended to
totally remove the language exempting a claimant from filing
a

notice of claim when there

indemnify the employee.

is no

statutory

duty to

(§63-30-11, Utah Code Ann. (1983

pocket supplement)).
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Chapter 48 of Title 63 was repealed, including
§63-48-4 -which obligated the State to indemnify employees
except when the judgment was based on gross negligence,
fraud,

or

malice.

(§63-48-1,

et

seq.,

(1983

pocket

supplement)).
These amendments cannot have retroactive effect
with respect to Madsen.

Otherwise, the cause of action

would be totally destroyed.
Madsen seeks to go to trial to establish gross
negligence on the part of the respondents.

Due to the

holding in Madsen v. Borthick, supra, this is Madsen's only
available cause of action.
Retrospective application of these statutes would
be more than a mere remedial change.

It would eliminate a

vested cause of action.
This Court has repeatedly held that a statute will
not be found to have retroactive effect if such action will
modify

vested

rights

or

interests.

See,

Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983).

for example,

In Pilcher, the

Court explained that there is an exception to this rule:
A contrary rule applies, however, where
a statute changes only procedural law by
providing a different mode or form of
procedure
for enforcing
substantive
rights.
Such remedial statutes are
generally applied retrospectively to
accrued or pending actions to further
the Legislature's purpose. 663 P.2d at
455.
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This "contrary rule" is not applicable here; the
amendments by the Legislature do much more than provide a
different

procedure

for

enforcing

substantive

rights.

Rather, a common law cause of action against government
employees

for gross negligence has been removed by the

legislature.
Madsen.

This is the only cause of action remaining to

To remove it by retroactive application of an

amendment would destroy

a right.

Such would be wrong.

Madsen should be allowed to proceed in this action.

The

Summary Judgment should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
A review of the brief, facts, and relevant law
compels

the

conclusion

inappropriate.

The

that

case

should

Summary
be

Judgment

remanded

for

was
trial

because:
1.

The dismissal of the original action was not

on the merits;
2.

The respondents

are not

immune

from suit

through the Governmental Immunity Act;
3.

It was not necessary to file a notice of

claim with respect to this action against the respondents;
4.

This action comes under §78-12-40, Utah Code

Ann. , and is thus not barred by the applicable statute of
limitations; and
5.
Immunity

The

Act may

1983

amendments

not be

applied

action.

14

to

the

Governmental

retroactively

on this

To reverse and remand will simply allow Madsen to
continue discovery and trial preparations. Madsen should be
allowed to have his day in Court to attempt to establish
gross negligence on the part of the respondents.
Respectfully submitted this Jg

day of March,

1984.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants
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